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LITERALITY 
James Barr 
Although the concept of the literal is very widely used in the discussion of biblical 
interpretation, it has seldom been deeply analysed. "Conservative" understandings of the 
Bible are often thought of as literal, but it is equally true that "critical" views are built 
upon literality. In some relations, literality seems to imply physicality, in others to mean 
exactitude in the rendering of "spiritual" realities. In Christianity the relation of Christians 
to the laws of the Old Testament is a prime area of application of these categories. Are 
the silences of the Bible to be taken as "literally" as its words? And does literality give 
us access to intentions? 
Nowhere is the concept of the literal more used than in reference to the interpre-
tation of the Bible. "Taken literally, this means so and so," we say; or "This 
shouldn't be taken literally." Literality as a theme belongs, indeed, to other areas 
of thought and research: in law, for instance, it is certainly important, and in 
literary criticism. But in no other field, perhaps, is the question of literality as 
central as in the study of the Bible. And it is from the tradition of biblical 
interpretation that the focal expressions and formulations appear to come: not 
least the contrast between letter and spirit, classically expressed by St. Paul: 
"the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Corinthians 3.6, KJV). 
It is surprising, in view of this, that, within the world of biblical scholarship, 
comparatively little discussion seems to take place about literality and the meaning 
of the literal. Scholars are very much aware ofthe traditions of non-literal interpre-
tation. Handbooks commonly furnish an account of the theories of the fourfold 
sense, both Jewish and Christian, and the importance of allegorical interpretation 
in particular is underlined by its presence and acceptance within the New Testa-
ment itself: "which things are an allegory," Galatians 4.24. This awareness is 
reinforced through study ofthe Jewish background: Philo's allegorical interpreta-
tion was roughly contemporary with the rise of Christianity, and in recent decades 
the Dead Sea Scrolls have further emphasized the importance of non-literal 
understandings of scripture. Twentieth-century biblical scholarship, contrary to 
many common impressions of it, devoted a great deal of serious discussion to typo-
logical and other non-literal modes of interpretation. I But all these various currents 
tended to work as if the problem lay in understanding and justifying the non-literal; 
they tended to proceed as if the sense of literality itself was known, or was plain 
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enough to be taken for granted. The present article will suggest that the sense of 
"literal," as applied to problems of biblical study, is far from being clear, and 
deserves and requires considerable discussion and clarification. 2 
In religion, at least in Christianity, the term "literal" tends for the most part 
to be used with a pejorative nuance. To "take the Bible literally" is thought not 
to be a good thing. People think that others take it literally, but they themselves 
do not do so. It is often thought of fundamentalists that they are those who take 
the Bible literally, but even they, while insisting on the complete infallibility of 
scripture, will very often dissociate themselves from "literalists," whom they 
consider to have a more extreme position. 3 Conversely, even among those who 
insist that they do "take the Bible literally," and that this is the only way to take 
'it, it must be considered doubtful whether they do succeed in carrying out the 
same literalism on which they insist. 4 Popular usage, then, seems to contain a 
goodly measure of confusion. 
For, on the other side, it must be clear that the literal sense of scripture is 
taken as immensely important. One can impart an air of great authority to a 
religious claim by saying that it is "literally" stated or required in the Bible. In 
traditional Protestantism that which "is written" has enormous authority: es steht 
geschrieben, and what is written seems, at first sight at any rate, to be the 
literality of the text. But in Roman Catholic theology also one finds statements 
to the effect that no central dogmatic claim is made without a basis in the literal 
sense of scripture. And it has been argued, whether rightly or wrongly, that 
modem biblical criticism too has the literal sense as its ultimate basis. 5 Literality, 
then, seems to be a bad thing, but also a good thing. 
If ambivalence of this kind surrounds the concept of the literal, it is doubtful 
whether authoritative pronouncements or definitions from any source will be 
found to clear up the difficulty. The present article will, in any case, not try to 
investigate any such authorities as there may be. It will concentrate rather on 
the ways in which we actually use the term "literal," in relation to various kinds 
of biblical materials and in relation to the ways in which biblical scholars work. 
And we shall avoid the trap-if it is one-of starting from the apparent etymology 
of "literal," with its connection with the idea of the "letter," though we shall 
have to come back to that at some stage. For it is doubtful if the idea of gramma. 
the letter, is really central to what is meant by the literal in modem speech. 
Nor shall we allow ourselves to become imprisoned within traditional concepts 
like that of the fourfold sense, literal, allegorical, moral and anagogical, or the 
corresponding set of Jewish terms. In spite of the formulas which systematize 
them, it seems doubtful whether these senses ever functioned together, systemat-
ically, as multiple senses of every passage within the same interpretation. More 
probably, they arise from the characteristics of different types of biblical passages, 
or from the compounding together of different styles of interpretation. Moreover, 
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even the most obviously opposed pair, that of literal and allegorical, displays a 
remarkable degree of common ground and interdependence. The defects of literal 
interpretation provide grounds for the quest for allegory. Conversely, allegory 
itself commonly builds upon literality. The smallest literal details within the text 
provide the clues upon which allegory is built, as is clearly manifest in Origen, 
the greatest of Christian allegorists,6 and equally or even more so in midrash, 
which is the comparable Jewish style of exposition. And, in any case, most 
people's minds no longer work within these schemes. People today who object 
to "taking the Bible literally" do not mean that it should be taken allegorically, 
or even (in the traditional term) figuratively; commonly they seem to mean 
something like "approximately" or "in a general sense" or "relatively" (Le., 
relative to what is said elsewhere in the Bible, or relative to knowledge known 
from other sources). In fact, we are not sure what is now the antonym of literal; 
the weak non-literal is an admission of that fact, and leads us no farther forward. 
We have to open the question on a new basis and ask (a) what is the content of 
literality, and (b) what are the alternatives to it. 
First, however, we may mention and get out of the way the elementary and 
obvious distinction between literal intention and literal truth, a distinction that 
is nevertheless often ignored. A statement may be intended literally, and in 
respect of its intention has to be understood literally, even if it is not in fact 
literally true. This has already been implied in my earlier remarks about biblical 
chronology. Let us suppose that figures like Adam's age of 130 when Seth was 
born, or Methuselah's 969 years, or the seven days of creation in Genesis, were 
intended literally (which seems to me to be the case, since otherwise they do 
not mean anything; but for the present it is sufficient that we suppose it); and 
let us suppose that we do not consider them as literally true: we do not think 
that Methuselah actually lived 969 literal years. Many people, probably a vast 
majority, take this position. But they tend to express it by saying that the 
chronological figures "are not meant literally." This is a way of evading the fact 
that, though people do not believe them to be true in a literal sense, it was in 
that literal sense that they were intended. If something is meant literally, even 
if it is not in fact true, an investigation of its literal sense must be the first step 
towards understanding what purpose or point there ever was behind the statement. 
By saying that passages are "not meant literally," people have tended to cut off 
all proper investigation of their meaning. Confusion in this respect is a basic 
problem of all modem discussions of literality. 
A more promising start, for an understanding of the literal, would be in 
physicality. Many biblical statements appear to assert events and relations that 
have a physical character: not necessarily only a physical character, indeed in 
most cases far from only a physical character, but nevertheless certainly and 
emphatically a physical character. The sentence that says: 
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And they brought the head of Ishbosheth unto David to Hebron (2 Sam. 
4.8) 
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is not exhausted by, but must include, the physical carrying of this man's head, 
to such and such a place which can be geographically located in principle, and 
at a time which again may not be exactly known but which in principle lies 
within the temporal framework of the world. And narrative statements of this 
kind are very numerous in the Bible. The central case is of course the story of 
the resurrection of Jesus. Literality will commonly be taken to mean that the 
physical body of Jesus, after being physically dead by normal physical criteria 
for death, was returned to life and emerged from the tomb. The details of the 
Gospel narratives correspond with this physical reality. Other narratives work 
in the same way, so for example what are usually termed "miracle stories." What 
was physically water became what was physically or chemically wine (John 
2.1-11). An iron axe-head (clearly an object of value) fell into the river [and 
sank and was lost]; the prophet ("man of God" is the term used) dropped in a 
wooden staff, and the iron head (presumably now attached to the staff, though 
this is not explicitly stated) physically floated on the water (2 Kings 6.6). In 
such cases literality does not mean that no other levels of meaning are to be 
accepted. The resurrection, the miracles, certainly contain spiritual meanings 
that go far beyond the fact of physical actuality. Nevertheless the physicality of 
the referents seems to many people to be indispensable and irreducible. Physicality 
affords a simple, commonsense, one-to-one correspondence between the entities 
referred to and the words of the text. 
Literality may be more severely stretched when one passes to eschatological 
realities. Are these attachable to precise physical definition in the same sense as 
the axe-head or the water that changed into wine? Jesus' return to earth may 
well be thought of as a fully physical return: "in like manner as ye have seen 
him go into heaven" (Acts 1.11). The ultimate dissolution of the existing world 
seems to be equally physical in character, or even more so: "the elements shall 
melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be 
burned up" (2 Peter 3.10). It is not surprising therefore if hell too is a physical 
place full of fire and smoke, where a thermometer would doubtless give a high 
reading. And yet, for many, hell resists a completely literal reading:7 partly for 
theological reasons, whether because people think God should not punish in this 
extreme way (a more "liberal" path of thought), or because eternal punishment 
means a final victory for evil (an argument compatible with a more "conservative" 
position), but partly also because hell and physicality fail to cohere very well 
(there is no place for it to be, and its violent heat would quickly destroy the 
physical existence of its inhabitants). The long and complicated sequence of 
final events in the Book of Revelation presents a challenge to literality in another 
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way, because, I think, of three things: (a) its very length and complexity means 
that a literal interpretation produces for many readers an impression of fantasy 
and an understanding of reality very different from that implied by most other 
parts of the Bible; (b) the setting of much of its material in heaven makes an 
anchorage in physicality difficult; and (c) the figurative character of some parts 
of it seems rather obvious. 
But first it may be proper to justify our placing physicality in this position of 
primacy, when many might have thought that historicity was more appropriate. 
It is certainly true that many discussions have treated "the historical sense" as 
a natural and obvious explication of "the literal sense." If understood literally, 
the Bible, where it narrates, narrates "true history." To treat literally a report of 
an ancient battle, or of Noah's flood, means to treat it as a report of events that 
"really happened." This covers many of the most important cases and fits in 
with the fact that literalists will generally believe the Bible to be "historically 
accurate." But historicity in this sense seems to me to be a sub-category of 
physicality. "Really happened" means "physically took place, and in detail as 
recorded." If Zerah the Ethiopian attacked Judah with a million men and three 
hundred chariots (2 Chronicles 14.9), these were the countable figures of forces 
physically present. If in the flood "all the high hills, that were under the whole 
heaven, were covered" [by the waters], this means a physical covering of all 
mountains in the world. Any modification of this physicality would be a reduction 
of literality. Statements might be historical in nature but would not count as 
literal because of their generality, which means in effect their lack of physical 
precision. To say that the Books of Joshua and Judges "described the establish-
ment of an Israelite state in Canaan," or that 2 Kings 22-23 "reflected the 
conditions of the decaying Assyrian Empire," or that the Book of Revelation 
"mirrored the relations between Christianity and the Roman Empire under Nero 
and/or Domitian" might be good historical statements but would not count as 
literal interpretation. And the fact that the same principle applies to future events 
is a good reason why we should prefer not to characterize it as a "historical" 
one in the first place. 
In any case "historical" is notoriously ambiguous as a term for the categorization 
of interpretations. For it may mean (1) an interpretation built upon the events 
as narrated (which might also be quite literal but not necessarily so); but it might 
also mean (2) an interpretation based upon the reality of historical events referred 
to, but somewhat inadequately described, in the Bible, and better known to us 
through other sources (such an interpretation might nevertheless contain consid-
erable literal elements); and it might be (3) "historical" in a quite other sense, 
in that it is an interpretation based primarily on the knowable thoughts and 
intentions of those who historically created the form of text that we have (and 
this too could treat the wording of the Bible quite literally but would use it for 
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a different purpose, not for restating the events narrated but for understanding 
the mind of the narrators). Add to this the fact that much of the Bible is not 
narrative anyway-the central cases, especially for the entire history of Protestant 
interpretation, being the epistles of the New Testament, plus most of the Psalms-
and we have enough reason to avoid making any kind of close equation between 
literality and historicity. 
Physicality. then, we suggest, is one of the central aspects of literality. But 
it is certainly not the only one, for it is balanced on the other side by its 
near-opposite, spirituality. With a biblical sentence like "God is a Spirit" (John 
4.24), probably no one today supposes that even a literal interpretation is based 
on physicality. I include the qualifications "probably today" because, in the 
ancient world, it might have been possible to conceive of "spirit" as a kind of 
attenuated physical element: pneuma, after all, may be "wind" and "breath" in 
the Bible as well as "spirit." But in the modem world, for the average reader 
of the Bible, "spirit" and the spiritual are distinctively nonphysical, and for most 
literal interpretation a sentence like "God is a spirit" does not have physical 
content. In sentences like "God is a spirit" or "God is love," then, literality does 
not work through grounding in physicality. Literality means, rather, accuracy 
in the delineation of spiritual or supernatural realities. Expressions like those 
quoted convey a fully adequate and indeed unsurpassable impression of the 
reality of God. Literality here means therefore: God is very exactly as the words 
of scripture describe him to be. The words convey divine reality. Undoubtedly, 
the fact that these words convey divine reality, in a degree that cannot possibly 
be surpassed, reacts upon the cases of narrative and physical description, causing 
them also to have a similar degree of literal accuracy. 
And all this might be entirely satisfactory, were it not for another difficulty 
that is immediately raised. Theological statements of scripture about God, if all 
taken literally, lead to mutual contradictions, which are usually overcome only 
by abandoning the literal level of interpretation. According to Mark and Luke, 
Jesus taught that to divorce a wife and marry again involves adultery; according 
to Matthew (Matthew 5.32. 19.9), he added the exception "except on the ground 
of unchastity. "" According to St. Paul, man is justified by faith, and not by 
works; but St. James avers that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith 
only" (James 2.24). God "is not a man that he should repent," we are told in 1 
Samuel 15.29: that is, unlike human beings, God does not change his mind: but 
elsewhere the Old Testament tells us repeatedly of God's changing of his mind, 
the most notable being his regret that he had created humanity at all, Gen. 6.6. 9 
Taken literally, these pairs of sayings appear to produce serious contradictions: 
Man is justified by faith, no he isn't, he is justified by works; God does not 
change his mind, yes he does, several times in central biblical themes. If one 
sticks to pure literality these are insuperable contradictions. Literality in this 
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sense doubtless influenced the rejection of James by Luther. If one does not 
wish to reject a contrary opinion altogether, one has to move away from the 
ground of pure literality. Most commonly this means: a move to the ground of 
intentionality. James did not intend, when he spoke of justification by works, 
the same SOli of justification by works which Paul rejected. The words may be 
the same, but what James meant positively was not the same thing that Paul 
meant when speaking negatively. And this might be quite right. But the fact 
remains: in biblical interpretation, in the handling of purely theological assertions 
(as distinct from historical or the like), literality runs into difficulties because of 
consequent inner contradiction, and is thereby forced into some non-literal mode 
of understanding. Taking the texts literally, we come to recognize that there are 
very different theological ideas within the Bible. On the other hand, these may 
be brought back together by saying that the texts have an inner unity, in that 
they all relate to one great theological reality, a reality which has several different 
facets so that each text can comprehend only one of these facets at a time. But 
this is a tum to non-literality. Some such combination of literal and non-literal 
understanding is surely common. 
Central to this set of questions is the use of the Old Testament, and especially 
its legal portions, within Christianity. The Jewish law commanded certain specific 
actions, and prohibited certain others. Certain birds are "unclean" and may not 
be eaten (Leviticus 11.13-20; Deuteronomy 14.11-20); a sort of ritual trial is 
required for a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5.11-31); the levirate 
marriage, an arrangement whereby a brother must take the widow of his deceased 
brother and produce a child to his name, is commanded (Deuteronomy 25.5-10); 
and so on. In many such cases, again, literality seems to mean physicality: 
certain actions must be performed. or avoided. In many cases, though not in 
all, no explanation or rationale is given for the commands and prohibitions. They 
simply have to be done, or not to be done. 
Within Christianity some elements of the Old Testament law were, at least 
approximately, taken over (e.g., forbidden degrees of kinship for marriage); 
others had some sort of analogical continuance (Christian restriction of activities 
on Sunday had some sort of distant similarity to the Jewish Sabbath); others 
again, and these surely the majority, were totally unrepresented in any kind of 
Christian practice. Yet the Hebrew laws continued to be respected as part of 
authoritative scripture. The result was a curious melange of literal and non-literal 
understandings. On the one hand the biblical laws were understood not to be 
prescriptions for specific action; they were rather, perhaps, didactic texts meant 
to inspire the Christian in the pursuit of righteousness and holiness, but without 
any idea of his or her actually performing the acts specified. In this context the 
Jewish use of the law was often regarded as physical, external and lacking in 
spiritual motivation, while the Christian use of it concentrated on the general 
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and spiritual values it was supposed to communicate. In more extreme cases the 
strangeness, the apparent absurdity, of the Hebrew laws was taken as a veritable 
proof that an allegorical meaning was intended: it was forbidden to eat the kite, 
as an unclean bird, but, said Origen, who ever wanted to eat a kite anyway?-so 
that clearly some non-literal meaning was intended. III 
All this might have been fine if it had been consistently so, but of course it 
was not. Much older Protestantism had a strong sabbatarian element: it departed 
from literality in observing the first day of the week rather than the seventh, but 
was literal in refraining strictly from actual physical work. The Catholic Middle 
Ages took literally the prohibitions of usury and were forced into all sorts of 
practical economic difficulties by so doing. Protestantism somehow extracted 
itself from that aspect of the law of God. 
Problems of this kind with ethical commands were not confined to the Old 
Testament: similar things happened in the New. Jesus' teaching about divorce 
was commonly put into fairly literal effect, while his prohibition of the swearing 
of oaths (Matthew 5.33-37) was generally ignored, and was literally observed 
only by particular groups, notably the Quakers. The express requirement of the 
Apostolic Council of Acts 15 that Gentile Christians should abstain from the 
consumption of blood was, apparently, forgotten. The New Testament therefore, 
at least in its ethical instruction, seemed to produce inequalities of execution 
similar to those arising from the Old. 
Nevertheless the Old Testament was the dominant case. Although the legal 
requirements of the Old were sometimes taken literally in Christianity, and the 
ethical instructions of the New sometimes taken non-literally, the total general 
impression was that the Old Testament, typically taken literally within Judaism, 
should be understood non-literally within Christianity. And "non-literally" meant, 
essentially, "spiritually": it led not into the realm of specific physical acts, places, 
animals and birds, but into the realm of spiritual motivation, general principles, 
communication of the ultimate will of God. So it was understood. The Hebrew 
laws, in large part, communicated didactic guidance leading towards righteous-
ness and holiness. rather than specific instructions about acts to be performed. 
The existence of this mass of important material, thus understood, was a strong 
force supporting non-literal understanding in other areas also. And although the 
law was a primary case, the same effect was produced by the prophetic literature 
and many historical passages. Jerusalem, though admittedly a town in Palestine, 
was in the fullest sense the heavenly city towards which the church was journey-
ing. The Midianites were the forces of temptation and the Devil. Only Jews 
thought of these as primarily empirical places and tribes. 
Ironically, if Christians understood the Hebrew Bible "spiritually" rather than 
literally, Jews in fact did not understand it literally either. Thus the command, 
'Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk" (Exodus 23.19; Deuteronomy 
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14.21), was widely understood as requiring the total separation of milk dishes 
and meat dishes in all supply of foods, something that could not be supposed 
to be a literal understanding. Much Jewish exegesis was non-literal: it could be 
highly allusive, figural, allegorical. Yet this fact was never sufficient to overcome 
the feeling among Christians that Jewish understanding was earthly, physical. 
The avoidance of mixing milk and meat was, in a way, just as earthly and 
physical a requirement as the avoidance of boiling a kid in its mother's milk. 
Christians, faced with this same command, insofar as they ever thought about 
it, which was seldom, tended to welcome the idea that some kind of idolatrous 
Canaanite practice was being forbidden, a view that gained some limited support 
from new discoveries during this century. The avoidance of what Canaanites did 
offered an analogy to the avoidance of sin by modem Christians; and such an 
idea meant that the prohibition had a sort of rationale, one that lay behind the 
ancient text, so that it was no totally arbitrary command, and also furnished a 
link with Christian spiritual needs. The perception of such a rationale means a 
reduction of literality: it is no longer simply the text telling you what to do, 
there is the perceptible motivation behind the text that now makes the text 
meaningful to the reader. Rationales of this kind, however, are sometimes a 
matter of pure guesswork or wishful thinking: who can, for instance, provide a 
rationale for the list of unclean birds? Even the Canaanites can hardly be called 
in to provide a motivation: for all we know, they may have had the same list of 
unclean birds in their own religion. 
It is common to consider the relations between the literal and the metaphorical 
to be a central problem, and for philosophers perhaps it is. Yet it is doubtful 
whether biblical scholarship finds it very serious or important, or spends a great 
deal of time on devising methods to deal with it. The literalist, curiously enough, 
and contrary to what one might expect of him, is not much troubled by the fact 
of metaphor within the Bible. Hearing God referred to as "the rock of my 
salvation" (Psalm 89.26), he does not for a moment take this to mean that God 
is a geological object. Metaphor is a part, a large part, of ordinary language: a 
common type of metaphor can be considered as a part of literality itself. II That 
parables are imaginary tales, and not statements of empirical or historical fact, 
seems obvious to the literalist as to other people, though he would probably 
hesitate to call them fictions. What troubles him is not the metaphor or the 
obvious parable, but the imprecise narrative which yet contains truth or the 
legend or myth which is supposed to convey truth but on the surface is untrue: 
for with these there is no easy route from literality to meaning. 
In this connection it is striking how the term "literal" expands in meaning so as to 
include the non-literal, so long as it is important enough. This is very common in 
colloquial usage, as with the person who proudly said, "Our parish priest is liter-
ally the father of every boy and girl in the village." My daily newspaper a few days 
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ago assured me, when talking about British agricultural policy, that "The Ministry 
of Agriculture is still literally fighting the last war." In the understanding of the 
Bible, people use the term "literal" not for the meaning that is derived purely and 
simply from the words themselves, but for the meaning that is most important and 
authoritative. It is not surprising, then, but very understandable, that the Jewish 
exegetical term peshqt, commonly rendered as the "plain," "simple," "natural" or 
"literal" sense of the words, as contrasted with allegorical or other senses, is 
actually found to be used for the sense most strongly approved by the main 
authorities, whether it was literal in fact or not. 12 In Christianity likewise an 
interpretation may be felt to be "literal" if it is powerful and dominant enough, 
especially if the truly literal sense is little known. 
Literality is also connected with the segmentation of the text, and this is 
another reason for its powerful influence in Jewish and Christian religion. Notice 
how most of our examples have been short citations. Our tradition of understand-
ing, in this respect, goes back to a time when an oracular view of scripture was 
held. 13 Any passage, however brief, gave an accurate and authoritative theological 
view. It is often thought that in older times the Bible was a complete whole, 
and that modem scholarship split it into many strata and sources. This is not at 
all true. Though the Bible was a complete whole, much theological and religious 
discourse worked with extremely brief passages, often of only a few words: it 
is significant that such a passage was traditionally known as "a text." This very 
minuscule segmentation of the biblical books into individual utterances, each of 
which must be true and authoritative, heightened the problem of literality. If 
one "text" said that God changed his mind, and another "text" said that, not 
being a human being, he never changed his mind, these could scarcely fail to 
be in contradiction. But if we take an entire book as our "text," say the book 
of Genesis, then the perspective changes. Can there be a really literal interpretation 
of an entire book?14 
Literality seems also to depend on another circumstance: it depends on a 
knowledge of the meaning of the terms used. How can we understand a sentence 
that tells us that "God made a covenant with Abraham," if we do not already 
know what a covenant is? To understand "Thou shalt not kill" one has to know 
what sorts of destructive action come within the purview of the words used. 
What does the term "usury" mean? Unlike the situation in Judaism, where the 
religion keeps alive the ancient language of the Bible, most Christianity works 
from comparatively modem translations. If "what we call 'literal' usage is accus-
tomed usage,"IS then most people interested in the Bible will be guided by the 
English usage of their own modem religious environment. Literality of interpre-
tation can thus easily be linked with ideas of meaning that derive from the modem 
world and from the recent trends in exposition. People just assume that they 
know the meanings of terms like "covenant," "kill," "slave," "redeem," "holy," 
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"repent" and a host of others. They read into them modern English meanings, 
most commonly meanings derived from recent preaching traditions and from the 
modern church cultures in general. Since literality implies that the words directly 
represent the actualities, it is easy to assume that commonly understood meanings 
are accurate and correct. It is not by accident that in our English-speaking world, 
a world in which biblical literalism has been very powerful, there was over 
centuries one single Bible translation that was very widely, almost universally, 
used, and it is a version which used a fairly high degree of literalism in its 
renderings. 16 Much literalist interpretation was done by persons ignorant of the 
biblical languages and contemptuous of academic intellectual penetration into 
the ancient world. Seen from this point of view, the opposite of literalism is not 
allegory or the like, but an awareness of the languages and cultures out of which 
the Bible has corne, as a necessary guide to the meanings of the words, which 
otherwise can greatly mislead. Or, putting it in another way, such an awareness 
may be needed in order to establish a good and positive literality. But for such 
an awareness one has to go outside the Bible itself, for its languages and its 
cultures extended beyond the boundaries of its own text. 
Another and an important dimensional aspect of literality must now be con-
sidered. The words of scripture, shall we say, furnish the basis and criterion for 
meaning. Literality may suggest: these words supply all that is needed, and one 
must not go beyond what they actually say. But what of the silences of the 
Bible? What of the fact that there are places where something may well be 
expected, but nothing is said? Are these silences authoritative, in the same way 
as the words are? 
Literality should properly require that, just as nothing that is there in words 
should be ignored, so nothing that is not there in words should be allowed. To 
add--even if from another part of the Bible-that which is not there in words 
is to destroy literality. The shape of biblical books is made up by the words that 
are there, but also by that which is left out. It is characteristic, and extremely 
important for the understanding of St. Mark, that it ended (if it did) with "for 
they were afraid" at Mark 16.8. If it was not so, much that is well written by 
Kermode17 cannot be right; but doubtless it is right. If Mark had no account of 
the resurrection appearances of Jesus, that fact is extremely important for the 
understanding of the book. Equally important is the fact that Mark had no account 
of the birth of Jesus; for these two silences may fit together. Now literality would 
be very wholesome, and literarily very creative, if it insisted that Mark should 
be interpreted in terms dictated by its own shape, a shape formed among other 
things by these two great absences. Such, however, has not been the tradition 
of literality. For the most part it has gone the other way. What was there in 
words must be taken literally, but what was not there in words could be filled 
up by material taken from elsewhere, if interpreters thought that it was theolog-
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ically sound. Thus, before modem criticism demonstrated the special and central 
place of Mark, no one tried to interpret it according to its peculiar literary form. 
Mostly, they just added in the things that were in other gospels or other documents, 
ignoring the fact that this destroyed the literary shape or "final form" (the favoured 
modem expression) of the book. A Virgin Birth story, which is clear in Matthew, 
muted in Luke, and literally entirely absent from Mark and John, was thus 
nevertheless there in all four. On the three "synoptic" gospels (Matthew, Mark 
and Luke), Calvin commented not on the basis of a synopsis, which would have 
shown their distinctiveness, but on the basis of a "harmony," which added them 
together and obscured the separate creativity of the books. The same was done 
with the legal parts of the Pentateuch, or with Samuel/Kings and Chronicles. If 
we say, as is not uncommon, that the "Matthean exception" concerning divorce 
is only stating something that is "implied" in Mark and Luke,IR this mayor may 
not be justifiable but is certainly contravening any consistent rule of literality. 
Extreme contraventions of literality occur when, for example, thousands and 
millions of years are inserted between the days of the creation story in Genesis 
1, in order to stretch out the time scale of the Old Testament and make it more 
credible in the light of modem science. 19 
And yet we would be over-literal if we were to say that nothing, ever, was 
to be allowed as an implication that had been left unsaid. It is a terrible legalism 
of literality if we say that nothing can be accepted unless it is there in explicit 
words. We previously gave an example ourselves with the floating axe-head. 
The iron head fell into the river, the prophet cast in a wooden handle, and the 
iron floated. It does not say that the handle fitted into the iron head but I explained 
it so. It seems reasonable to say that it is implied, though to prove it would 
require many pages of argument for a very small result. But, when Mark and 
Luke are silent about the exception in divorce expressed by Matthew, that silence 
may be much more significant, and the explanation that they merely "implied" 
what Matthew made explicit may be much too easy. This would seem to mean 
that strict literality cannot be an adequate judge of silences: only a refined and 
sophisticated literary judgement can deal with them. 
Finally, another central aspect of literality is its relation to intention. We 
already touched upon this in our discussion of the Hebrew law (above), and the 
importance of that connection is confirmed by the Pauline contrast between 
"letter" and "spirit" (above), for that contrast is expressed as part of a larger 
contrast between the situations of the "old covenant" and of the "new." 
Today it is increasingly realized that a written document does not necessarily 
give access to the intentions of the author and, correspondingly, cannot necessarily 
be interpreted on the basis of these intentions. A document takes on a sort of 
life of its own and has its own meaning, created and expressed by its own 
wording and its own shape. A legal document is a primary case. No doubt the 
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intentions of the framers will have some influence on understanding, insofar as 
they can be known; but in a sense the document itself is the best evidence of 
these intentions, and in any case the verbal form of the document, its literality, 
is the strongest force in deciding what is to be done. In recent years theological 
interpreters have willingly, all too willingly, grasped at these insights, wishing, 
for reasons good or bad, to reduce the emphasis on authors' intention that they 
thought to be excessive in biblical scholarship. The Bible, then, they have 
thought, has to be understood out of itself, out of its own verbal reality, rather 
than out of the intentions of authors or out of the history from which it came. 
This looks like a good argument in favour of literality. The foolishness of 
theologians is well seen in their failure to see how seriously it may backfire. 
For this argument, consistently pressed. removes from the scene not only the 
intentions of the historical human writers, but the intentions of God as well. 
The Bible is supposed to communicate to us the will of God; such is a normal 
assumption of all kinds of Judaism and Christianity. But much of it, by strict 
literal interpretation, does not tell us of his intentions or his will. It is one of 
the elementary observations about biblical style, and especially Hebrew narrative 
style, that it is very reserved in making express statements about intentionality. 
What did God think about Abraham's allowing his wife to be taken into Pharaoh's 
house (Genesis 12. 14-20)? Taken literally: no answer. What was God's intention 
in relation to the elaborate story of Absalom's rebellion against David (2 Samuel 
14-19)? No answer. That God created heaven and earth in seven days is, literally, 
clear, but why did he do it in just that way? Why in seven days, when nine might 
have been appropriate (there are eight works of creation, plus a rest day), or twelve, 
or perhaps forty-nine, which would have fitted with the jubilee just as seven fits 
with the week? What was God's purpose in doing it in just this way? The text, taken 
literally, offers no answer. Why did Jesus, not only occasionally but repeatedly, 
forbid his disciples to make known that he had been identified as Son of God (e. g. , 
Mark 3. 12)? What did God have in mind in passing on to us the story of the com-
munity of goods in the early church (Acts 4.34-37)? On a literal basis, again, no 
answer. Of course, preachers and expositors have been free with explanations of 
God's will in relation to all such episodes, but in all such cases they had to go out-
side of literality and read into the passages motivations and intentions derived 
from other sources, whether biblical or traditional. 
A written text, at least a written text such as the Bible is, communicates will 
and intention poorly, or does it well in some places but not at all in others. The 
deficiencies of written text for the communication of divine will were well known 
in biblical times. Prophets received their message by the direct voice of God 
and not through a written text. Jesus wrote nothing and did not command his 
disciples to write anything. It was Pilate. not Jesus, who pronounced the sentence 
"What I have written, I have written" (John 19.22), a supreme testimony to 
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literality. In Greek culture Plato had argued that committal to writing was an 
unworthy mode for the transmission of the profoundest truth, and the Pharisees 
seem to have had a similar view about their own oral tradition. 20 Anyway, 
whatever the case with other types of text, the particular character of the Bible, 
or of many parts of it, makes it, if taken strictly literally, a poor communicator 
of will and intention. Since will and intention are very much demanded by the 
Bible-reading public, they have to obtain these from elsewhere, other than from 
the literality of the text. 
On the other hand, writing of a document involves fixation. Will and intention, 
expressed in living conversation, may receive some different expression as 
addressed to different persons, or to the same persons again after the lapse of 
time. Obscurities in an earlier expression can be corrected. Account can be taken 
of new social situations, which did not exist at that earlier time. Since the biblical 
text was finally fixed, it has spoken from within cultures and societies that to 
us are remote. Within biblical times themselves it was otherwise, and much was 
done in the updating of the materials: "modernizations" of the Hebrew laws, 
rewriting of Samuel/Kings by Chronicles, revision of gospel narratives by later 
gospels, later letters by St. Paul that may supersede his earlier thinking. But 
final fixation made this lively movement of revision obscure to the average 
reader. Literality in the use of biblical texts tends towards a fixation in social 
categories of ancient times, and away from the perception of fresh expressions 
of the divine will. This is perhaps not the whole, but is certainly a part, of the 
Pauline contrast between letter and spirit. 
Most modem biblical scholarship works, in these situations, by a different 
path. Let us consider again the story of creation. It does not suppose that this 
story, taken literally, narrates the actual sequence and physical facts of the origin 
of the world. But it works from the literality of the text towards a picture of the 
theology which expresses itself through that text, in relation to (or opposition 
to) other theologies that may have existed in ancient times, in Israel or outside 
it. This theology, once perceived, then feeds into the general theological discus-
sion and understanding of the world and God's purpose towards it. 
With this we must leave our subject, not having handled all aspects of it but 
perhaps as much as could be done within our space. To sum up, literality stands, 
within biblical studies, in a stance like that of the Roman god Janus, looking 
two opposite ways. It can be salutary but also damaging, progressive and creative 
but also dulling and restrictive. It can be compatible with, and encourage, a 
metaphysic of sharp distinction between the spiritual and the physical, whereby 
each is related to the other but remains sharply distinct: what literality finds hard 
to deal with is a category that comes somewhere between, such as legend, or 
imprecise narration, or events such as the resurrection where the Bible is as firm 
on its non-physical as on its physical character. 21 These are difficult for literality 
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to cope with, not because they are not believable, but because with such categories 
there is no clear and simple path between the words and the realities referred 
to. Again, literality can assimilate the Bible to a legalistic character and enforce 
upon us requirements to be believed or obeyed, without providing also the 
meanings and intentions which alone gave them sense in biblical times. It can 
encourage deep misunderstanding of terms and thereby support our reading of 
our own world-view into the Bible. 
But on the other side literality is enormously creative, and much has been lost 
to the churches since people began to say, carelessly and unthinkingly, "you 
shouldn't take it literally." Literal form of words is the key to so much that is 
important and creative. It leads toward greater critical discrimination, and thereby 
towards the detection of the paths along which the theology of the Bible has 
moved. Undoubtedly, as the apostle said, the letter kills while the spirit makes 
alive; but, if we may reverently add a footnote to his words, there are times and 
ways in which the letter helps us on our way to identifying and understanding 
that same spirit that makes alive. 
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